Enjoying great popularity in decision theory, epistemology, and philosophy of science, Bayesianism as understood here is fundamentally concerned with epistemically ideal rationality. It assumes a tight connection between evidential probability and ideally rational credence, and usually interprets evidential probability in terms of such credence. Timothy Williamson challenges Bayesianism by arguing that evidential probabilities cannot be adequately interpreted as the credences of an ideal agent. From this and his assumption that evidential probabilities cannot be interpreted as the actual credences of human (...) agents either, he concludes that no interpretation of evidential probabilities in terms of credence is adequate. I argue to the contrary. My overarching aim is to show on behalf of Bayesians how one can still interpret evidential probabilities in terms of ideally rational credence and how one can maintain a tight connection between evidential probabilities and ideally rational credence even if the former cannot be interpreted in terms of the latter. By achieving this aim I illuminate the limits and prospects of Bayesianism. (shrink)

In everyday life and in science we acquire evidence of evidence and based on this new evidence we often change our epistemic states. An assumption underlying such practice is that the following EEE Slogan is correct: 'evidence of evidence is evidence' (Feldman 2007, p. 208). We suggest that evidence of evidence is best understood as higher-order evidence about the epistemic state of agents. In order to model evidence of evidence we introduce a new powerful framework for modelling epistemic states, Dyadic (...) Bayesianism. Based on this framework, we then discuss characterizations of evidence of evidence and argue for one of them. Finally, we show that whether the EEE Slogan holds, depends on the specific kind of evidence of evidence. (shrink)

I focus on the No-Paradise Dilemma, which results from some initially plausible epistemic ideals, coupled with an assumption concerning our evidence. Our evidence indicates that we are not in an epistemic paradise, in which we do not experience cognitive failures. I opt for a resolution of the dilemma that is based on an evidentialist position that can be motivated independently of the dilemma. According to this position, it is rational for an agent to believe a proposition on the agent’s total (...) evidence just in case the (total) evidence stably supports the proposition. Based on this evidentialist position, I argue that it is not an epistemic ideal in the actual world that we hold rational beliefs that are logically equivalent to our rational beliefs. The dilemma is resolved by giving up this ideal for the actual world and adopting the evidentialist position in terms of stable evidential support. (shrink)

When members of a group doxastically disagree with each other, decisions in the group are often hard to make. The members are supposed to find an epistemic compromise. How do members of a group reach a rational epistemic compromise on a proposition when they have different (rational) credences in the proposition? I answer the question by suggesting the Fine-Grained Method of Aggregation, which is introduced in Brössel and Eder 2014 and is further developed here. I show how this method faces (...) challenges of the standard method of aggregation, Weighted Straight Averaging, in a successful way. One of the challenges concerns the fact that Weighted Straight Averaging does not respect the evidential states of agents. Another challenge arises because Weighted Straight Averaging does not account for synergetic effects. (shrink)

On an evidentialist position, it is epistemically rational for us to believe propositions that are (stably) supported by our total evidence. We are epistemically permitted to believe such propositions, and perhaps even ought to do so. Epistemic rationality is normative. One popular way to explain the normativity appeals to epistemic teleology. The primary aim of this paper is to argue that appeals to epistemic teleology do not support that we ought to believe what is rational to believe, only that we (...) are permitted to do so. In arguing for that, I defend an epistemic teleological position that is radical in nature. It involves no commitment to aiming at the truth. I conclude by dispelling some worries that have been raised about my position. (shrink)

The Stoic theory of knowledge was founded by Zeno on a perceptual and crudely materialistic base, but subsequently developed into an elaborate theory involving λεκτ which has proved difficult to reconstruct. The evolution of the school, influenced not only by internal differences but also by interaction with the Platonic Academy, certainly contributed to this development. Hence any adequate reconstruction of the Stoic theory of knowledge must take account of the differences among the positions of the different representatives of the school (...) with respect to the criticism put foward by the Academics. I propose here to clarify Zeno's position, showing how Arcesilaus' criticism helped to expose certain lacunae and thus to bring about changes in doctrine on the part both of Zeno himself and of his immediate successors. (shrink)

Material artefacts consist of many smaller – and ultimately natural – objects such as molecules and atoms that have been intentionally rearranged in such a way as to take the shape of a particular artefact and fulfil its functions. Whenever the arrangement of several parts results in properties that go beyond the properties of the individual parts or their sum, it can be said that this arrangement has resulted in a new object. Once created, material artefacts may take part in (...) natural processes such as reproduction and evolution and cannot be fundamentally distinguished from fully natural objects. This article provides a number of – mainly biological – examples that show the traditional Aristotelian dichotomy between nature and artefacts to be highly problematic and suggest a continuum instead. Most importantly, it is argued that living beings and artefacts are equally capable – or sometimes incapable – of self-reproduction and that there are numerous objects which are both living beings and artefacts. (shrink)

In the literature, one finds two accounts of the normative status of rational belief: the ought account and the permissibility account. Both accounts have their advantages and shortcomings, making it difficult to favour one over the other. Imagine that there were two principles of rational belief or rational degrees of belief commonly considered plausible, but which, however, yielded a paradox together with one account, but not with the other. One of the accounts therefore requires us to give up one of (...) the plausible principles; whereas the other allows us to save them both. The fact that it allows us to save both of the plausible principles might well be considered a strong reason in favour of the relevant account. The permissibility-account-based resolution of the lottery paradox suggests that the permissibility account is a candidate for being supported in this way, since the account seems to save two plausible principles of rational belief and rational degrees of belief. I argue that even if the permissibility account were supported in this way the support would be defeated, since one cannot provide an analogous resolution of the preface paradox. The principles remain unsaved by the permissibility account. (shrink)

Semantyka teoriomonogościowa dla wielowartościowych rachunków pozycyjnych Celem artykułu jest zdefiniowanie adekwatnych semantyk teoriomonogościowych dla rachunków pozycyjnych.

Antero, contrariamente a Schelling, não aceita a identificação do Absoluto ideal com o Absoluto real. Segundo ele, o Absoluto e a Realidade constituem uma antinomia radical, dado que "a razão não tem de si mesma ... conhecimento total e infalível". O Absoluto de Antero é ideal, o ideal que atrai a força dinâmica em sua trajectória no sentido da auto-realização, reconhecendo-se como Absoluto, independente do mundo fenoménico, só quando tiver atingido a mais alta consciência-de-si. O pensamento filosófico de Antero, expresso (...) sumariamente nas Tendências Gerais da Filosofia teve grande proeminência na formação da corrente de pensamento que constituiu a filosofia portuguesa no século XX. /// Antero, autrement que Schelling, n'accepte pas l'identification de l'Absolu idéal avec l'Absolu réel. À son avis, l'Absolu et la Réalité constituent un'antinomie radicale parce que "la raison n'a pas de soi même la connaissance totale et infaillible". L'Absolu d'Antero est idéal, l'idéal qui attire la force dynamique en sa trajectoire, dans le sens d'auto-réalisation, en se reconnaissant comme Absolu, indépendant du monde phénoménique seulement après avoir la plus grande connaissance-de-soi. La pensée philosophique d'Antero, exprès, en abrégé, en Tendências Gérais da Filosofia a eu une énorme proéminence dans la formation de la pensée qui a constituée la Philosophie Portugaise au XX.e siècle. /// Unlike Schelling,Antero does not identify the ideal Absolute with the real Absolute. In his views, the relation between Reality and the Absolute is of a radical antinomy since "reason has of itself... no total and infalible knowledge". Antero's Absolute is ideal, the ideal that attracts the dynamic force in its trajectory towards sel-realization, and that recognizes itself as Absolute, that is, independent of the phenomenic world, only when it has achieved its highest self-awareness. Antero's philosophical views, briefly stated in the Tendêncies Gerais da Filosofia, had a strong influence upon the formation of the intelectual movement of the Portuguese philosophy in the twentieth century. (shrink)

Definition of the problemIn medicine and bioethics, the term “suffering” is not clearly defined from a normative point of view. Nevertheless, suffering due to infertility is the starting point for medical interventions in assisted reproductive medicine. This implies that the unfulfilled desire to have children is a form of suffering, but the validity of this statement has not yet been clarified.ArgumentsBased on descriptions of some common concepts, certain characteristics of suffering are identified. We discuss the significance of suffering as an (...) anthropological condition in connection with the mission of medicine to alleviate human suffering. Furthermore, the risks of reproductive treatment and their significance for health are addressed.ConclusionWe conclude that the unfulfilled desire to have children is a form of suffering, and therefore has a normative value. The legitimacy of appropriate somatic intervention can only be established by taking the psycho-existential dimension of suffering into account. (shrink)

Der Begriff Leiden ist in der Medizin und in der Bioethik bisher kaum reflektiert und dahingehend in normativer Hinsicht wenig bestimmt. Dennoch bildet das Leiden an einer Unfruchtbarkeit den Ausgangspunkt für die medizintechnischen Interventionen der assistierten reproduktionsmedizinischen Behandlung. Dabei wird implizit angenommen, dass der unerfüllte Kinderwunsch ein Leiden ist. Ob der unerfüllte Kinderwunsch allerdings ein Leiden darstellt, ist bisher nicht eindeutig geklärt worden.Ziel dieses Beitrages ist es, die Annahme, dass es sich beim unerfüllten Kinderwunsch um ein Leiden handelt, zu überprüfen. (...) Anhand der Darstellung einiger gängiger Leidenskonzeptionen werden Merkmale von Leiden herausgearbeitet, die als treffende Grundannahmen für eine Leidensbestimmung gelten können. Es wird sich zeigen, dass der unerfüllte Kinderwunsch, entsprechend der Leidenskonzeptionen, als ein Leiden angesehen werden sollte, und ihm somit ein normativer Stellenwert zukommt. In einem weiteren Schritt ist zu klären, ob das Leiden an einem unerfüllten Kinderwunsch als ein Rechtfertigungsgrund für reproduktionsmedizinische Interventionen gelten kann. Dafür wird zum einen der Stellenwert von Leiden, als eine anthropologische Grundbedingung, im Zusammenhang mit dem Leidenslinderungsauftrag der Medizin diskutiert. Zum anderen werden die Risiken der reproduktionsmedizinischen Therapien sowie deren Bedeutung als Gesundheitsressourcen erörtert. Dabei wird deutlich, dass Leiden an einem unerfüllten Kinderwunsch immer ein psychosomatischer Komplex ist. Nur unter Berücksichtigung der psychoexistenziellen Dimension des Leidens ergibt sich eine Legitimation für eine angemessene somatische Intervention. (shrink)

Der Begriff Leiden ist in der Medizin und in der Bioethik bisher kaum reflektiert und dahingehend in normativer Hinsicht wenig bestimmt. Dennoch bildet das Leiden an einer Unfruchtbarkeit den Ausgangspunkt für die medizintechnischen Interventionen der assistierten reproduktionsmedizinischen Behandlung. Dabei wird implizit angenommen, dass der unerfüllte Kinderwunsch ein Leiden ist. Ob der unerfüllte Kinderwunsch allerdings ein Leiden darstellt, ist bisher nicht eindeutig geklärt worden.Ziel dieses Beitrages ist es, die Annahme, dass es sich beim unerfüllten Kinderwunsch um ein Leiden handelt, zu überprüfen. (...) Anhand der Darstellung einiger gängiger Leidenskonzeptionen werden Merkmale von Leiden herausgearbeitet, die als treffende Grundannahmen für eine Leidensbestimmung gelten können. Es wird sich zeigen, dass der unerfüllte Kinderwunsch, entsprechend der Leidenskonzeptionen, als ein Leiden angesehen werden sollte, und ihm somit ein normativer Stellenwert zukommt. In einem weiteren Schritt ist zu klären, ob das Leiden an einem unerfüllten Kinderwunsch als ein Rechtfertigungsgrund für reproduktionsmedizinische Interventionen gelten kann. Dafür wird zum einen der Stellenwert von Leiden, als eine anthropologische Grundbedingung, im Zusammenhang mit dem Leidenslinderungsauftrag der Medizin diskutiert. Zum anderen werden die Risiken der reproduktionsmedizinischen Therapien sowie deren Bedeutung als Gesundheitsressourcen erörtert. Dabei wird deutlich, dass Leiden an einem unerfüllten Kinderwunsch immer ein psychosomatischer Komplex ist. Nur unter Berücksichtigung der psychoexistenziellen Dimension des Leidens ergibt sich eine Legitimation für eine angemessene somatische Intervention. (shrink)

In March 1986, a public symposium took place in Heidelberg about the “unresolved potential dangers of genetic engineering”. The event was organized by institutions affiliated with the environmental movement. Choosing this symposium as an example, the article shows how the public appearance of scientists can be understood as a form of political activism. The article shows how specialists from fields as diverse as biology, chemistry, physics, law and political sciences tried to place political messages by putting themselves in the limelight (...) as independent scientists. I argue that the symposium was both: a place of science communication intertwined with political agitation that, as should be noted, happened in a time when the West German government was working on the legislation of genetic engineering, legitimated by relying on independent expertise. It can be concluded that the discourse of scientific independence became a strategic tool in the controversial debate about the uses and dangers of genetic engineering. Thus, it draws attention to a dimension of political-scientific activity which cannot be fully grasped by the concept of ‘the expert’ that is established in the history of science. (shrink)

The aim of the study was to examine the role of self-esteem in resisting the influence of materialistic goals of four social role models in adolescents. Previous studies showed a negative correlation between the psychological health of teens and striving for materialistic goals, one of the main sources is the social modeling of materialism. Two studies were carried out. The first, correlational study, was conducted on target teens and their mothers, fathers, and peers of their choice. It examined if self-esteem (...) is a moderator of the relationship between the materialism of social role models and the materialism of teens. The second, experimental study, was conducted on target teens only. It examined how boosting the self-esteem of teens and activating materialism of social role models may affect the materialism of teens. Study 1 showed a significant interaction effect of self-esteem and the materialism of peers on the materialism of teens. The interaction effects of self-esteem and other role models were not significant. Study 2 showed that elevated self-esteem lowered the influence of the materialism of peers on the materialism of teens. The results were not significant when other role models were analyzed. The results obtained in the presented studies indicate that the self-esteem of teens may have an important role in resisting the influence of materialism role models of peers. Practical implications of the studies for the psychological health of teens are also discussed. (shrink)

La pittura islamica e in particolare l’illustrazione dei manoscritti, opere a circolazione limitata e prevalentemente privata, ha avuto una notevole diffusione godendo del patrocinio delle corti. Alcune pitture, soprattutto quelle che illustrano l’Ascensione celeste del profeta Muhammad, ma anche le Storie dei Profeti, pitture datate al XIV e XV secolo, rappresentano l’uno e gli altri col volto scoperto. Solo relativamente tardi, in particolare nel mondo iranico, ma anche presso gli ottomani o i Moghul dell’India, il volto del Profeta diventa una (...) convenzione iconografica. Un versetto coranico afferma che Dio parla all’uomo o per Rivelazione o dietro a un velame. Per questo nell’iconografia della pittura islamica si constata che il Profeta o altri personaggi possono figurare con il volto coperto da un velo. Questo segno di rispetto, col tempo, si trasformerà in parola e il sembiante del Profeta sarà reso calligraficamente. Islamic painting and particularly miniature painting illustrating manuscripts, books restricted to few people and for personal use, had a considerable circulation thanks to the patronage of courts. Some paintings, chiefly those illustrating the heavenly Ascent of the prophet Muhammad, but also Histories of Prophets, paintings dated to the XIV and XV century, show him and the others barefaced. Only fairly later, particularly in the iranian world, but also among Ottomans or the Moghuls of India, the face of the Prophet becomes an iconographic convention. According to a Koranic verse God speaks to man either through Revelation of behind a veil. For this reason in the iconography of islamic painting the Prophet or other people may appear with the face covered by a veil. This sign of respect, in the course of time, changed and the countenance of the Prophet was rendered in words, that is calligraphically. (shrink)

This paper is the introduction to the Special Issue “Philosophical Methods”. The Special Issue will be published by Synthese.